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Ayers v. Township of Jackson: Damages for
the Enhanced Risk of Future Disease
I. Introduction
The law regarding the recovery of damages for the en-
hanced risk of future disease is quickly becoming an impor-
tant area of tort law. However, because of the speculative na-
ture of this type of claim, courts have been reluctant to award
damages absent some present manifestation of disease or
upon the plaintiffs showing a certain probability that disease
will occur.'
In the case of Ayers v. Township of Jackson,2 the New
Jersey Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether
township residents could recover damages for the unquanti-
fled enhanced risk of disease arising out of the "palpably un-
reasonable"3 operation of a municipal landfill. The court held
that they could not.4 This decision affirmed the holdings of
the appellate division5 and the trial court.6
All background facts and information regarding Ayers
will be examined in Section II of this note. Section III will
explore the law of recovery for the enhanced risk of disease in
various jurisdictions under different circumstances. The trial
court's decision will be discussed in Section IV, and the appel-
late division's decision will be analyzed in Section V. Section
1. Siegel & Salvesen, Sterling v. Velsicol: The Case for a New Increased Risk
Rule, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10155, 10156 (1987).
2. 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
3. Plaintiff-Respondent's Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion for Certifi-
cation at 1, Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987)(No. 24-
248) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Memorandumi.
4. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 579, 525 A.2d at 298.
5. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 202 N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1985), aff'd as modified in part and rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525
A.2d 287 (1987).
6. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 A.2d 184 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1983), aff'd as modified, 202 N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
1
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
VI will analyze the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision, as
well as the dissenting opinion. Section VII will contain a final
analysis, and Section VIII will conclude that the New Jersey
Supreme Court would have made a fairer and more feasible
decision had they allowed the plaintiffs damages for their en-
hanced risk claims.
II. Facts
From 1972 until 1978, residents of the Legler area of
Jackson Township, New Jersey had their well water contami-
nated by toxic chemicals leaching into the Cohansey Aquifer
from a landfill operated by Jackson Township. 7 In December
1978, a health emergency was declared and area residents
were instructed to stop using their well water. From then until
July 1980, household water was provided in various ways.
First, residents carried water from tanks placed in various lo-
cations throughout the township. Later the township deliv-
ered water to the residents homes in plastic-lined containers.
By July 1980, the township had constructed a water supply
system. Residents were charged a $610 hookup fee and normal
service resumed.8
Over three hundred residents initiated a suit against the
Township in the Superior Court of New Jersey, claiming to
have been harmed by the Township's negligent operation of
the landfill. The plaintiffs sought damages for: emotional dis-
tress from learning that they had been drinking contaminated
water for six years; diminished quality of life from having no
running water for twenty months; costs of future medical sur-
veillance; enhanced risk of future diseases such as cancer, liver
and kidney disease, and civil rights violations.9 This note will
concentrate on the damages sought for the enhanced risk of
future diseases.
7. The following chemicals were found in varying concentrations: acetone, ben-
zene, chlorobenzene, chloroform, dichlorofluoromethane, ethylbenzene, methylene,
chloride, methyl isobutyl ketone, 1,1,2,2-tetrachloroethane, tetrahydrofuran, 1,1,1-
trichloroethane and trichlorethylene. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 568, 525 A.2d at 292.
8. Ayers, 202 N.J. Super. at 112, 493 A.2d at 1317.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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At trial, it was determined that for six years the Town-
ship had operated its landfill in such a manner as to contami-
nate underlying groundwater with highly toxic chemicals.
These chemicals then migrated to the plaintiffs' wells, expos-
ing them for years to the harmful effects of the toxins.' 0
III. The Law of Recovery for the Enhanced Risk of
Disease
The law regarding damages for the enhanced risk of fu-
ture disease is a rapidly evolving area of tort law." Exposure
to hazardous substances at home and in the workplace has
created a tremendous volume of toxic tort litigation which ap-
pears to be creating new trends in tort law. Historically,
courts have considered "whether such damages are too remote
or too speculative to be awarded."' 2 The courts usually re-
quire the plaintiff to show a present manifestation of disease,
or a certain probability that it will occur in the future. 3 Most
claims for enhanced risk involve diethyestilbestrol (DES) or
asbestos which will be the focus of this analysis, as well as
cases involving exposure to other hazardous materials.
A. DES Cases
In Morrissey v. Eli Lilly & Co., 4 the plaintiff, on behalf
of two classes of "DES daughters," brought an action against
the manufacturers and sellers of DES and the hospital to re-
cover damages for the increased risk of cancer. In denying the
10. l'laintitlfs Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1.
11. Siegel & Salvesen, supra note 1, at 1056.
12. Id.
13. Id. See also, Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589 (5th Cir.
1986) (probability of developing cancer is necessary to recover damages); Laswell v.
Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983) (mere possi-
bility of developing illness is not sufficient); Sarzynski v. Stern, 13 Mich. App. 158,
163 N.W.2d 641 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (future injury must be reasonably certain to
occur for damages to be awarded); and Askey v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 102
A.D.2d 130, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242 (4th Dep't 1984) (no damages allowed for enhanced
risk of disease).
14. 76 Ill. App. 3d 753, 394 N.E.2d 1:369 (1st Dist. 1979).
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plaintiff's class certification,15 the court stated:
[p]laintiff... is essentially alleging the existence of latent
disease as a present injury to herself and the proposed
classes. The nexus thus suggested between exposure to
DES in utero and the possibility of developing cancer or
other injurious conditions in the future is an insufficient
basis upon which to recognize a present injury. In Illinois,
possible future damages in a personal injury action are
not compensable unless reasonably certain to occur."
Similarly, in Mink v. University of Chicago, several
women who had taken DES brought causes of action based on
products liability, battery and failure to notify.1 8 After finding
no evidence that any plaintiff suffered from any abnormality
claimed, the court dismissed the enhanced risk claim and
noted:
[c]learly, one of the essential elements in a claim for strict
liability is physical injury to the plaintiff. The closest the
complaint comes to alleging physical injury is the allega-
tion of a "risk" of cancer. The mere fact of risk without
any accompanying physical injury is insufficient. 9
15. Id. at 761, 394 N.E.2d at 1376.
16. Id. The court failed to find a reasonable certainty despite the fact that it
noted:
As a proximate result of the nature and conditions of DES, all members of
the proposed class have developed cancerous lesions, adenocarcinoma, ade-
nosis or certain tumors or cytological abnormalities which in time will gener-
ate adenocarcinoma or other cancerous conditions.
Id. at 756, 394 N.E.2d at 1372.
17. 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
18. Id. at 715-16. The plaintiffs claimed that as a result of taking DES, their
daughters developed abnormal cervical cellular formations and were at an increased
risk of developing vaginal or cervical cancer. They also claimed they and their sons
suffered reproductive tract and other abnormalities, and were at an increased risk of
getting cancer. Id. at 715.
19. Id. at 719. See also, Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171
(1982) (holding no recovery unless "more likely than not to occur").
[Vol. 5
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B. Asbestos Cases
In Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 0 the plaintiff
brought suit against seventeen asbestos manufacturers for his
asbestosis and enhanced risk of developing mesothelioma or
other cancer, due to his inhalation of asbestos fibers." The
plaintiff's theory, supported by testimony, was that as a result
of working with asbestos, he inhaled asbestos fibers, which ini-
tiated a scarring process that damaged his lungs. Later, "other
changes occurred as the fibers worked through his lung tissues
and lodged in the membrane surrounding his lungs. '2 2 This
caused "pleural thickening, plaques, calcifications and asbes-
tosis as well as the likely future development of mesothelioma
and cancer. ' 23 The plaintiff claimed that his injury was the
inhalation of the fibers and their invasion of his body causing
physical damage. 4 The plaintiff presented expert testimony
that there was a reasonable medical probability that he would
develop and die from cancer as a result of inhaling these
fibers. 5
In ruling on the plaintiff's enhanced risk claim, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "a plaintiff who seeks to re-
cover for damages he is likely to sustain in the future must
prove these future damages by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Certainty, however, is not required; the plaintiff need
demonstrate only that the event is more likely to occur than
not. ' '" 2 Since the plaintiff satisfied this standard, he was al-
lowed to recover.
In Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp.,28 the plaintiff
brought suit against the defendants after he was diagnosed as
20. 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985).
21. Id. at 1134.
22. Id. at 1137.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1137.
25. Id. at 1138.
26. Id. at 1137-38.
27. Id. See generally, Note, Damages for an Increased Risk of Developing Can-
cer Caused By Asbestos Exposure Are Only Recoverable If It Is More Likely Than
Not That Cancer Will Develop, 51 Mo. L. Rev. 847 (1986).
28. 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986).
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having pleural thickening, a condition associated with expo-
sure to asbestos.2 9 In affirming the district court's decision
dismissing the plaintiff's enhanced risk claim, the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals stated the rule in New Jersey: "[i]f the
prospective consequences may, in reasonable probability be
expected to flow from the past harm, plaintiff is entitled to be
indemnified for them." 30 Since the plaintiff could offer no evi-
dence of a probable future cancer, 31 the court found his argu-
ment to be "fundamentally at odds with New Jersey's ap-
proach to compensable injury."32
C. Other Hazardous Substances
A recent case with facts similar to Ayers is Sterling v.
Velsicol Chemical Corp.33 In Sterling, the plaintiffs were ex-
posed to hazardous chemicals that leached from Velsicol's
chemical waste burial site into their water wells."' The plain-
tiffs alleged present injuries and an enhanced risk of cancer as
a result of drinking, bathing and cooking in the contaminated
water.3 5 The court concluded that Velsicol's operation of the
waste burial site was an ultrahazardous activity,3M and Velsicol
29. Id. at 81.
30. Id. (quoting Coll v. Sherry, 29 N.J. 166, 175, 148 A.2d 481, 486 (1959)).
31. Id. The district court record revealed that, had plaintiff's expert been al-
lowed to testify, he could not have presented epidemiological data showing a risk in
excess of fifty percent, nor could he offer an opinion that the plaintiff, "more likely
than not would experience cancer." Id. at 81 n.1.
32. Id. at 82.
33. 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
34. Id. at 306. This class action was tried with five plaintiffs, chosen because
their claims were generally representative of the claims of all class members. Id. at
307.
35. Id. at 308. At trial, the plaintifis presented evidence of severe headaches,
hearing and vision problems, kidney problems (including cancer), weight loss, nausea,
optic neuritis, as well as other medical problems. Id. at 325-44. Evidence of the chem-
icals involved and the effects of the exposure to them was also in evidence. Id. at 430-
38.
36. Id. at 315-16. See also Restatement (Second) Torts § 519-20 (1977).
§ 519. General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activ-
ity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol5/iss1/8
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was strictly liable for all of the plaintiffs' injuries. The court
treated the increased risk as an existing condition with recov-
erable damages. 7
In Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc.,38 the plaintiff
sought damages for his increased risk of contracting cancer as
a result of being accidentally soaked with toxic chemicals
while working as a seaman. 9 After reviewing recent commen-
taries urging recognition of a claim for "enhanced risk,"
whether greater or less than fifty percent," the court con-
cluded, "a plaintiff can recover only where he can show that
the toxic exposure more probably than not will lead to can-
cer." 1 Since the plaintiff failed to allege that he had cancer,
or would probably develop it, no relief could be granted."'
In Brafjord v. Susquehanna Corp.,3 five plaintiffs filed
an action alleging they were exposed to excessive levels of ra-
diation as a result of the defendant's uranium processing op-
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
§ 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following
factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is out-weighed by its danger-
ous attributes.
Generally courts will apply strict liability to activities which are abnormally danger-
ous or ultrahazardous. See generally, Madden, Liability for Abnormally Dangerous
Activities, 10 J. Prod. Liab. 1 (1987).
37. Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 321-22.
38. 788 F.2d 315, reh'g denied, 797 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 319. Hagerty was drenched with dripolene, a carcinogenic chemical
containing benzene, toluene and xyolene. Id. at 317.
40. Id. at 319.
41. Id. Although plaintiff failed to specify what his increased risk was, the court
assumed it to be no more than fifty percent. Id.
42. Id. at 320. The only evidence of physical injury the plaintiff presented was
that he suffered a brief period of dizziness, leg cramps, and stinging in his extremities
after the dousing. Id. at 317.
43. 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984).
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eration." They claimed this radiation caused chromosome
damage and an increased risk of cancer. 45 Before trial, the de-
fendant moved for summary judgment with respect to this
claim."
After reviewing Tenth Circuit law, the court noted that
"in order to recover future damages for enhanced cancer risk,
plaintiffs must have suffered a definite, present physical in-
jury. '14 The court refused to grant summary judgment, noting
that the defendant will have ample opportunity to question
the extent of the plaintiffs' subcellular damage at trial. 8
As the cases demonstrate, a plaintiff will not recover
damages without a present physical injury, a probability of
more than fifty percent that the disease or injury will occur,
or unless the court views the enhanced risk as a present in-
jury, rather than a speculative future one.
IV. The Trial Court's Decision
On April 15, 1983, the Superior Court of New Jersey de-
cided the case of Ayers v. Township of Jackson.49 The plain-
tiffs sought damages for the enhanced risk of cancer as well as
44. Id. at 15. During uranium ore processing, certain radioactive waste materials
known as "mill tailings" are produced. The plaintiffs alleged that prior to the
purchase of their home, mill tailings were removed from the defendant's mill and
placed in and around the foundation of their home. Id.
45. Id. at 16.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 17. The plaintiffs characterized their injuries as the present damage to
their cellular and subcellular structures, incurred as a result of their exposure to radi-
ation. Id. The court seemed to give great weight to the plaintiffs' expert witnesses
who were scheduled to testify. It noted:
[Pllaintiffs have produced experts of national renown who express their opin-
ion that the extent of subcellular damage resulting to plaintiffs because of
their exposure to the radiation constitutes a present physical injury. Dr. Rad-
ford describes the injury as present in the sense that the "damage has been
done" and the " 'trigger' of a cancer change has been cocked." Dr. Morgan
characterizes the injury as present in the sense that the subcellular changes
operate to deprive plaintiffs of a degree of immunity which they had enjoyed
prior to their exposure to the mill tailings.
Id. at 18.
48. Id.
49. 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 A.2d 184 (Ocean County 1983).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol5/iss1/8
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liver and kidney diseases.6 The plaintiffs' experts claimed
that the individual risks would vary "according to dose, dura-
tion and exposure and inherent susceptibility, with children
and infants having the highest risk."51 The plaintiffs charac-
terized their risk of suffering a disease as "reasonably proba-
ble, therefore, compensable." 2
In their argument, the plaintiffs relied upon Schwegel v.
Goldberg,53 and Lindsay v. Appleby. 54 In Schwegel, a five per-
cent enhanced risk of epilepsy was held to be compensable, 55
and in Lindsay, the court held that an "increase in the risk of
injury traceable to the conduct of a defendant is compensa-
ble." 6 Both cases involved severe head injuries with possible
epilepsy or seizures in the future.
The Ayers court distinguished these cases because the
plaintiffs' claim of enhanced risk was not caused by severe
trauma or bodily injury, 57 nor could they establish a percent-
age increase.6 The court could not find a New Jersey case in
which a plaintiff was allowed to recover "for such speculative
future consequences of a tortious act. 659 The plaintiffs could
not quantify the risk, nor could any of their experts "attempt
to advance an opinion that any of the 325 plaintiffs have or
will probably contract any of the diseases."60
In reaching its decision, the court relied upon Coil v.
50. Id. at 565, 461 A.2d at 186.
51. Id. at 566, 461 A.2d at 187.
52. Id. at 567, 461 A.2d at 187. Dr. Joseph Highland, an eminent toxicologist
testified at trial for the plaintiffs. Translating groundwater data, he determined the
amount of exposure to each plaintiff. He then compiled toxicity profiles of the chemi-
cals involved. From this he was able to conclude that "virtually all plaintiffs were at a
significant and substantial increased risk of developing cancer," as well as having "a
high or very high likelihood of developing liver or renal disorders." Respondent-Ap-
pellant's Brief to the Superior Court at 24-25. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 202
N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (1985) (App. Div. No. A-2103-83T3)(citing various
trial court transcripts).
53. 209 Pa. Super. 280, 228 A.2d 405 (1967).
54. 91 111. App. 3d 705, 414 N.E.2d 885 (1980).
55. Schwegel, 209 Pa. Super. at 288, 228 A.2d at 409.
56. Lindsay, 91 111. App. 3d at 714, 414 N.E.2d at 891.
57. Ayers, 189 N.J. Super. at 568, 461 A.2d at 187.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 567, 461 A.2d at 187.
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Sherry," and Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. 62 In
Coil, damages were allowed for the prospective consequences
of tortious conduct if the "prospective consequences may, in
reasonable probability, be expected to flow from the past
harm."63 In Ciuba, the court held "reasonable probability" re-
quired "evidence in quality sufficient to generate belief that
the tendered hypothesis is in all human likelihood the fact."'64
In granting the defendants' partial summary judgment
motion for the enhanced risk claims, Judge James Havey
noted:
(t)o permit recovery for possible risk of injury or sickness
raises the spectre of potential claims arising out of tor-
tious conduct increasing in boundless proportion. With-
out minimizing plaintiffs' claim, the court cannot ignore
the fact that much of what we do and make part of our
daily diet exposes us to potential, albeit remote, harm. As
long as the risk exposure remains in the realm of specula-
tion, it cannot be the basis of a claim of injury against the
creator of the harm.6
However, Judge Havey noted that this ruling would not
leave the plaintiffs without a remedy if the diseases occurred
at a later time. He indicated that under the New Jersey's
"discovery rule,"66 the statute of limitations in a personal in-
jury action does not begin to run until the plaintiff becomes
aware of the injury, or when the plaintiff realizes that his in-
jury was caused by the fault of another. 7
V. The Appellate Court's Decision
The plaintiffs and the defendant both appealed to the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. 8 The ap-
61. 29 N.J. 166, 148 A.2d 481 (1959).
62. 27 N.J. 127, 141 A.2d 761 (1958).
63. Col, 29 N.J. at 175, 148 A.2d at 486.
64. Ciuba, 27 N.J. at 139, 141 A.2d at 767.
65. Ayers, 189 N.J. Super. at 568, 461 A.2d at 187.
66. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2 (West 1983). See infra note 111.
67. Ayers, 189 N.J. Super. at 568, 461 A.2d at 187.
68. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 202 N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (N.J.
[Vol. 5
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peal was decided 3-0 on June 4, 1985." The plaintiffs argued
that "virtually all plaintiffs were at a significant and substan-
tial increased risk of developing cancer,"70 and that they "had
a high or a very high likelihood of developing liver or renal
disorders."71 The plaintiffs also claimed to have sustained
sub-clinical cellular damage as a result of the defendants' ac-
tivities.72 These arguments were based upon the findings of
Dr. Joseph Highland, a toxicologist who testified for the plain-
tiffs at trial.73
In dismissing the plaintiff's sub-clinical cellular damage
theory, the court relied upon Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail
Corp.74 There the court held "that the possible existence of
subclinical asbestos-related injury prior to manifestation may
be of interest to a histologist. [H]owever, that subclinical in-
jury resulting from exposure to asbestos is insufficient to con-
stitute the actual loss or damage . . . required to sustain a
cause of action under generally applicable principles of tort
law." 75
The court also cited Coil v. Sherry,76 in holding that
"[w]hile it is true that damages are recoverable for the pro-
spective consequences of a tortious injury, it must be demon-
strated that the apprehended consequences are reasonably
probable. 7 7 The court could find no way to award damages of
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287
(1987). On appeal, the defendants challenged the trial court's awards for emotional
distress, quality of life and future medical surveillance. Id. at 113, 493 A.2d at 1317.
The plaintiffs appealed the pro tanto reduction of their award by the $850,000 settle-
ment with a codefendant, the dismissal of their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the refusal to allow damages for the enhanced risk of diseases. Id.
69. Id. at 129, 493 A.2d at 1326.
70. Id. at 121, 493 A.2d at 1322. See supra note 52.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1985)
75. Id. at 942 (quoted in Ayers, 202 N.J. Super at 121-22, 493 A.2d at 1322).
76. 29 N.J. 166, 148 A.2d 481 (1959).
77. Ayers, 202 N.J. Super. at 125, 493 A.2d at 1324. The court felt that the plain-
tiffs' sub-clinical cellular damage theory rested entirely upon Dr. Highland's opinion.
It was unsupported by clinical evidence, and was unable to be quantified. Id. at 121-
22, 493 A.2d at 1322-23.
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this sort "without knowing in some way, the degree of
enhancement.""8
In reaching its decision, the court was also mindful of the
legislative intent of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, 9 where
the legislature expressed hope that "the courts will exercise
restraint in the acceptance of novel causes of action against
public entities." 80
The defendant also argued that the trial court erred in
ruling that the discovery rule would apply to any future
claims by the plaintiffs."' In reply to this, the appellate divi-
sion said the trial court's ruling was dictum only and [had] no
controlling significance to the future rights of the parties."82
VI. The New Jersey Supreme Court's Decision
A. Majority Opinion
As a result of the appellate division's decision, the plain-
tiffs petitioned and the defendant cross-petitioned the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey for certification. Certification was
granted, 83 and in a 5-1 decision written by Justice Stein, the
supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part."4
78. Id. at 125-26, 493 A.2d at 1324.
79. Ayers, 202 N.J. Super. at 122-23, 493 A.2d at 1323. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:1-1 to
12-3 (West 1982). Particularly important in this case was § 59:2-1 - Immunity of
public entity generally:
a. Except as otherwise provided by this act, a public entity is not liable for an
injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public
entity or a public employee or any other person.
b. Any liability of a public entity established by this act is subject to any
immunity of the public entity and is subject to any defenses that would be
available to the public entity if it were a private person.
80. Ayers, 202 N.J. Super. at 122-23, 493 A.2d at 1323. (quoting comments to
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:2-1 (West 1982)).
81. Id. at 124, 493 A.2d at 1324.
82. Id. at 125, 493 A.2d at 1324.
83. 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987). On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme
Court, the plaintiffs sought review of all adverse portions of the appellate division's
judgment (no damages for enhanced risk, the pro tanto reduction of the award, the
denial of the Civil Rights claim, and the denial of damages for medical surveillance or
emotional distress), and the defendant sought review of the award of damages for
impairment of quality of life. Id. at 567, 525 A.2d 292.
84. Id. at 623, 525 A.2d at 321. For affirmance in part and reversal in part were
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol5/iss1/8
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Again, the plaintiffs sought damages for the enhanced
risk of future illnesses.8 5 Citing Feist v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 86 Schwegel v. Goldberg,8 7 and other cases, 8 the plaintiffs
argued that the increased risk was a presently existing condi-
tion in each plaintiff, and that they should be compensated
for it.89
In Feist, the Oregon Supreme Court allowed an instruc-
tion to the jury that it could consider susceptibility to menin-
gitis in its award of damages, 0 and in Schwegel, the Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court held that compensation could be
awarded for a five percent enhanced risk of epilepsy."1 The
plaintiffs argued that they were not seeking to recover for the
ultimate disease because that would be speculative.2 They
emphasized that they were only pursuing, and were entitled
to, damages for "the presently existing medical condition of
enhanced susceptibility to disease".93
The defendants argued that the enhanced risk claim was
actually a claim for pain and suffering which was barred by
the New Jersey Tort Claims Act because it was against a pub-
lic entity.9 4 Citing Lindsay v. Appleby 5  and Figlar v.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, Pollack, Garibaldi and Stein. Concurring
in part and dissenting in part was Justice Handler. Id.
85. Supplemental Brief for Certification by Plaintiffs-Petitioners at 22, Ayers v.
Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987) (No. 24-248) [hereinafter
Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief].
86. 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973).
87. 209 Pa. Super. 280, 228 A.2d 405 (1967).
88. Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief, supra note 85, at 28-29 (citing Starlings v. Ski
Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507, 510 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (allowing damages for an
increased risk of arthritis); Lindsay v. Appleby, 91 111. App. 3d 705, 714, 414 N.E.2d
885, 891 (1980) (where such injuries are compensable as pain and suffering).
89. Id. at 25-26.
90. Feist, 267 Or. at 402, 517 P.2d at 679.
91. Schwegel, 209 Pa. Super. at 288, 228 A.2d at 408-09.
92. Plaintiffs Supplemental Brief, supra note 85, at 25-26.
93. Id.
94. Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certification and In Support
of Cross-Petition for Certification at 14-15. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J.
557, 525 A.2d 297 (1987) (No. 24-248) [hereinafter Defendant's Brief]. See also supra
notes 79 & 80.
95. 91 Ill. App. 3d 705, 414 N.E.2d 885 (1980).
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Gordon,96 the defendant argued that other jurisdictions view
such claims as claims for pain and suffering.97 In Lindsay, the
court stated that "[an increase in the risk of injury traceable
to the conduct of a defendant is compensable as pain and suf-
fering," 98 and in Figlar, the court permitted compensation for
the anxiety resulting from the possibility of disease.9
The defendant also argued that it would be unwise to rec-
ognize a claim for enhanced risk because it is by its nature
unfair.100 The defendant relied upon Wilson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp.,'0 ' in which the court expressed fear
that plaintiffs who eventually incur the harm are undercom-
pensated and those who escape harm receive a windfall."0 2
Although the supreme court did find an enhanced risk
caused by a significant exposure to toxic chemicals to be an
injury under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, 03 the court
went on to note that "[e]xcept for a handful of cases involving
traumatic torts causing presently discernable injuries in addi-
tion to an enhanced risk of future injuries, courts have gener-
ally been reluctant to recognize claims for potential but un-
realized injury unless the proof that the injury will occur is
substantial. ' °104
The court cited Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 0 5 in
which the plaintiffs' sought damages for enhanced risk due to
contamination of their well water. The Anderson court held
that "[a] plaintiff is entitled to compensation for all damages
that reasonably are to be expected to follow, but not those
that possibly may follow, the injury which he has suffered."'10
The supreme court also noted that some courts require
96. 133 Conn. 577, 53 A.2d 645 (1947).
97. Defendant's Brief, supra note 94, at 15.
98. Lindsay, 91 111. App. 3d at 714, 414 N.E.2d at 891.
99. Figlar, 133 Conn. at 585, 53 A.2d at 648.
100. Defendant's Brief, supra note 94, at 14-15.
101. 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
102. Id. at 120-21 n.44 (cited in Defendant's Brief, supra note 94, at 14-15).
103. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 591-92, 525 A.2d at 304-05.
104. Id. at 592-93, 525 A.2d at 305 (citations omitted).
105. 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986) (cited in Ayers, 106 N.J. at 593, 525 A.2d
at 306).
106. Id. at 1230.
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the proof of future injury to be "reasonably certain,' 10 7 while
others permit recovery only if some "present manifestation of
disease" is exhibited.'08
In summing up, the court stated:
Our disposition of this difficult and- important issue re-
quires that we choose between two alternatives, each hav-
ing a potential for imposing unfair and undesirable conse-
quences on the affected interests. A holding that
recognizes a cause of action for unquantified enhanced
risk claims exposes the tort system ... to the task of liti-
gating vast numbers of claims ... based on threats of in-
juries that may never occur. It imposes on judges and ju-
ries the burden of assessing damages for the risk of
potential disease, without clear guidelines to determine
what level of compensation may be appropriate. It would
undoubtedly increase already escalating insurance rates.
It is clear that the recognition of an "enhanced risk"
cause of action, particularly when the risk is unquantified,
would generate substantial litigation that would be diffi-
cult to manage and resolve ....
On the other hand, denial of the enhanced-risk cause
of action may mean that some of the plaintiffs will be un-
able to obtain compensation for their injury. Despite the
collateral estoppel effect of the jury's finding that defend-
ant's wrongful conduct caused the contamination of
plaintiffs' wells, those who contract diseases in the future
.. may be unable to prove a causal relationship between
such exposure and their disease." 9
The court went on to note that because of its speculative
nature, to deny the claim would most closely reflect the legis-
lative intent of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act." 0 However,
107. Ayers 106 N.J. at 595, 525 A.2d at 306.
108. Id. at 595, 525 A.2d at 307.
109. Id. at 597-98, 525 A.2d at 307-08.
110. Id. at 598, 525 A.2d at 308. See supra notes 79-80. However, the court
noted, "[wie need not and do not decide whether a claim based on enhanced risk...
that is supported by testimony demonstrating that the onset of the disease is reason-
ably probable could be maintained under the Tort Claims Act." Id. at 599, 525 A.2d
at 308 (citations omitted).
1987]
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the court noted under New Jersey law "the cause of action
does not accrue until the victim is aware of the injury or dis-
ease and the facts indicating that a third party is or may be
responsible.""'
111. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 583, 525 A.2d at 300. The court also said that CERCLA
now pre-empts state statutes of limitation where they provide that the limitations
period for personal-injury or property-damage suits prompted by exposure to hazard-
ous substances starts on a date earlier than the "federally required commencement
date." That term is defined as "the date plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have
known) that the personal injury or property damage . . . were caused or contributed
to by the hazardous substance . . . concerned." Id. at 582-83, 525 A.2d at 300 (citing
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613,
1695-96 (1986) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9658). See also Hagerty v. L & L Marine
Servs. Inc., 788 F.2d 315, reh'g denied, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) and Eagle-Picher
Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Both held that neither
the statute of limitations nor the single controversy rule would bar timely claims in
toxic tort cases, although there was prior litigation between the parties for different
claims but the same tortious act.
See also, at N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214-b (McKinney Supp. 1988), which
states:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, an action to recover
damages for personal injury caused by contact with or exposure to phenoxy
herbicides while serving as a member of the armed forces of the United
States in Indo-China from January first, nineteen hundred sixty-two through
May seventh, nineteen hundred seventy-five, may be commenced within two
years from the date of discovery of such injury, or within two years from the
date, when through the exercise of reasonable diligence the cause of such in-
jury should have been discovered, whichever is later.
The commentary following the statute states: "in the interest of justice, the claims of
veterans of the Vietnam era should not be prohibited by the holding that a cause of
action accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to run from the "date of
injury." The obstruction to the prosecution of legitimate claims by individuals who
served in Indo-China should be remedied by a discovery statute of limitations." Com-
mentary, N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214-b (McKinney Supp. 1988). This was the New
York Legislature's response to the Agent Orange litigation.
See also, N.Y. Civ. Prac. L.& R. § 214-c-2 (McKinney Supp. 1988) which states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 214, the three year period within
which an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property
caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of
substances, in any form, upon or within the body or upon or within property
must be commenced shall be computed from the date of discovery of the
injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasona-
ble diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, which-
ever is earlier.
In enacting these rules, the New York Legislature created a new discovery rule for
virtually all toxic torts.
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B. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Handler pointed out
that the plaintiffs' risk of disease is higher than that of the
general population, 1 2 and the only reason that this risk could
not be quantified was because of scientific limitations and the
number and variety of chemicals involved. 1 3
In response to the majority's characterization of the
plaintiffs' claims as "depend(ing) upon the likelihood of an
event that has not yet occurred and may never occur,"'' Jus-
tice Handler noted that the exposure to the chemicals is the
event." 5 It has occurred. 16 It is not "a speculative or remote
possible happening."' 7 "(L)ike claims based on doctrines of
trespass, assault, invasion of privacy, or defamation, the dam-
ages suffered are not solely actual consequential damages, but
also the disvalue from being subjected to an intrinsically
harmful event. The risk of dreaded disease resulting from
toxic exposure and contamination is more frightening and pal-
pable than any deficits we may feel or imagine from many
other wrongful transgressions. "8
In response to the majority's fear that these claims would
lead to high volumes of litigation, the dissent suggested cer-
tain standards which would limit these claims and make them
more manageable." 9 He also noted that the legislature could
resolve potential problems with toxic tort litigation.2 °
In summing up, the dissent characterized the majority's
limitations on damages as "inadequate and unfair."'' He sug-
112. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 613, 525 A.2d at 316 (Handler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
113. Id. The dissent felt that the majority had wrongfully focused on the inabil-
ity to quantify the risk, instead of the contamination itself. Id.
114. Id. at 597, 525 A.2d at 308.
115. Id. at 618, 525 A.2d at 319.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 618-19, 525 A.2d at 319.
119. Id. at 620, 525 A.2d at 319. The dissent suggested using presumptions, bur-
dens of proof, and required minimal showings to reduce the volume of litigation. Id.
120. Id. at 620, 525 A.2d at 320.
121. Id. at 621, 525 A.2d at 320. It troubled the dissent that although the major-
ity found that plaintiffs had proven they had a significantly enhanced risk of con-
19871
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gested that the majority opinion be read narrowly, as only ap-
plicable to claims against public entities.'22
VII. Analysis
The court in Ayers would have reached a fairer and more
just verdict had they compensated the plaintiffs for their en-
hanced risk of future diseases. At trial, Dr. Susan Daum testi-
fied that the plaintiffs had already suffered physical injury in
the form of damage to the genetic material within their cells,
and that the plaintiffs' exposure to toxic chemicals "had pro-
duced a reasonable likelihood that they have now and will de-
velop health consequences from the exposure."' 23 This combi-
nation of present injury and likelihood of future consequences
should have been enough for the plaintiffs to recover, but the
majority concluded that they should not be compensated.12"
In Brafford,25 the plaintiffs' claim was based on present
damage to their cellular and sub-cellular structures.12 6 In re-
fusing the defendant's summary judgment motion, the court
noted that the extent of the plaintiffs' injuries could be ex-
plored at trial, and the fact finder could determine whether
damages were recoverable.1
27
In Ayers, Dr. Highland's testimony regarding the plain-
tiffs' cellular damage was quite similar to the evidence
presented in Brafford. The court in Ayers could have denied
the defendants' summary judgment motion, and allowed the
enhanced risk claim to be decided at trial. This would have
tracting serious diseases, this was not enough for recovery. The majority failed to
explain why a risk which creates a "reasonable probability" is compensable, while one
that "significantly enhances" is not. Id. at 617, 525 A.2d at 318. This "significantly
enhanced risk" could have satisfied the requirements of Morrissy, Gideon, Haggerty,
or Herber, and Dr. Highland's characterization of the cellular damage as a physical
injury could have satisfied the requirement in Mink. See supra text and accompany-
ing notes 14-42.
122. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 621 n.3, 525 A.2d at 320 n.3.
123. Id. at 590, 525 A.2d at 304.
124. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 579, 525 A.2d at 298.
125. Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984).
126. Id. at 17.
127. Id. at 18. Under Tenth Circuit law, recovery for enhanced risk requires the
plaintiff to have suffered definite, present physical injury. Id. at 17.
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been a more equitable way of considering the question of en-
hanced risk damages.
The facts in Ayers are quite similar to those in Sterling v.
Velsicol."2 ' In both cases, numerous plaintiffs sought compen-
sation as a result of toxic substances leaching into their well
water. In Sterling, the court awarded the plaintiffs enhanced
risk damages after determining that the enhanced risk was an
existing condition, not a speculative future injury.1 29
This type of analysis could have been used by the Ayers
court to compensate the plaintiffs. Instead, the court simply
pointed to the "discovery rule" as the plaintiffs' means of ob-
taining compensation when the injuries do occur."' As the
dissent recognized, "the tortious contamination is an event
that has surely occurred; it is not a speculative or remote pos-
sible happening. 131
Another way of avoiding injustice would have been to
adopt a pro-rata approach to the damages for enhanced
risk. 32 Under this approach, the factfinder determines the
probability of the enhanced risk in light of all the evidence
presented.133
The fact that a person is confronted with a ten percent,
fifteen percent, or twenty percent probability (in the
mathematical sense) that he will suffer future injuries
should be sufficient to permit him to recover for those fu-
ture injuries at least in proportion to the probability of
such injuries occurring. Therefore, in a hypothetical case,
if a man can demonstrate that there is a twenty percent
probability that he will have future injuries which would,
if they occurred, result in damage to him in the amount
128. 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
129. Id. at 321-22.
130. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 583, 525 A.2d at 300.
131. Id. at 618, 525 A.2d at 319.
132. See, Jordan v. Bero, 158 W. Va. 28, 62-63, 210 S.E.2d 618, 640-41 (1974)
(Neely, J., concurring).
133. In Ayers, the jury could have been given the task of assigning a probability
to the plaintiffs' claim of enhanced risk. Although the court found the risk to be
unquantified, given the evidence, it is likely that the jury would have found some
probability to exist.
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of a hundred thousand dollars, he should be able to re-
cover twenty thousand dollars from the defendant, which
recovery would represent the injury of incurring a twenty
percent probability of suffering one hundred thousand
dollars worth of damages.'"
This approach would avoid the hardship of having to prove
more than fifty percent probability, which most courts
require.
VIII. Conclusion
In Ayers, the New Jersey Supreme Court passed up an
ideal opportunity to follow a new trend in tort law. The analy-
sis in Section VII presents three possible ways of achieving
this: (1) characterizing the plaintiff's injury as present damage
to their cellular structure; (2) characterizing plaintiffs' en-
hanced risk as an injury; and (3) allowing a pro-rata determi-
nation of the plaintiffs' injury. The New Jersey Supreme
Court chose not to do so.
By rejecting the plaintiff's enhanced risk claims, the court
failed to recognize a valid claim for damages, and exposed it-
self to a potentially high volume of future litigation.' 35 In light
of all the evidence presented, the court should have granted
134. Jordan, 158 W. Va. at 64, 210 S.E.2d at 640-41.
135. By refusing to grant the 339 plaintiffs damages for enhanced risk, each
plaintiff became the basis for a potential lawsuit. This means that the failure to rec-
ognize this claim in one lawsuit could, theoretically, lead to 339 separate lawsuits as
the diseases manifest themselves in each plaintiff. These potential lawsuits may also
present plaintiffs with problems in proving causation. Due to the latency period,
there is the possible involvement of intervening causes, "sources of injury wholly
apart from the defendant's activities." These "intervening causes" hinder plaintiffs
chance of proving causation. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 585-86, 525 A.2d at 302.
With regard to the other damages, the supreme court allowed the plaintiffs' dam-
ages for diminished quality of life and medical surveillance; denied recovery for emo-
tional distress and civil rights violations, and upheld the pro tanto reduction of the
award.
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the plaintiffs monetary damages thus avoiding this potentially
voluminous and costly future litigation.' 36
James F. O'Brien
136. See generally; Comment, Increased Risk of Disease from Hazardous Waste:
A Proposal for Judicial Relief, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 635 (1985) (proposing alternative
means of compensating hazardous waste victims, while minimizing speculation and
limiting liability).
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